Though the global Jihadist movement came to the world attention following the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States , the movement predated the creation of Al Qaeda. The beginning of the global Jihadist movement can be traced back to the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in March 1928 by the Islamic Scholar Hassan Al Banna in Egypt . By 1945 the organization had about half a million followers throughout the Arab world advocating the group’s two main objectives: to fight secularism and Western influence on the Arab society, and the return to ‘Sharia’ (Islamic) law. Following the 1948 assassination of the Egyptian prime minister by group members, the organization was banned throughout the Arab world. Its former members and ideology, however, continued to spread throughout the world, inspiring other terrorist organizations.

The year 1979 was a turning point for fundamentalist Islam. This year saw the Iranian revolution (with the subsequent establishment of the first modern Muslim government), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the issuing of a fatwa (by Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a respected theologian who later on became Osama bin Laden’s mentor) declaring holy war in Afghanistan and the Palestinian-occupied territories. Combined, these issues were critical in the establishment of a truly global jihadist movement.

The same year Ayman Al Zawahiry, a former member of the Muslim brotherhood, and the blind Sheikh Omar Abed Al Rahman founded the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Following the 1981 assassination of the Egyptian president Sadat (for signing the 1979 peace agreement with Israel ) authorities destroyed the movement’s infrastructure and arrested many of the group’s members. After his release from jail Al Zawahiry found his way toAfghanistan , where he joined Osama Bin Laden in the creation of Al Qaeda, while the blind Sheikh ended his journey in an American jail after his conviction in the failed attempt to collapse the World Trade Center towers in 1993.

The Russian- Afghanistan war was a turning point for Muslim extremists and a boost for the global jihadist movement. It was the first time that Muslims from all over the world had joined together in the name of Islam to fight a jihad against the Soviet (atheist) occupation of a primarily Muslim state. These jihad fighters -- known as “ mujahideen ” – defeated the Soviet army, gaining worldwide attention by forcing the unilateral super power retreat.

The Soviet military defeat enhanced the mujahideeni religious faith, believing it was the cause of their victory. In 1989 the highly motivated Arab fighters, led by Osama Bin Laden and others, created the Al Qaeda (The Base) in Afghanistan, and began looking for new venues for jihad. Al Qaeda quickly built training camps and filled them with fresh young followers fascinated by war stories and the prevalence of Islam. The next step was aiding Muslims in other parts of the world likeBosnia , Jumo and Kashmir ,Chechnya ,Sudan and, in recent years, Iraq.

The military success inAfghanistan gave Al Qaeda operatives and local Muslim militia in Mogadishu ,Somalia the courage to attack the US forces on a mission to arrest Somali clan officials. The withdrawal of theUS forces from Somalia soon after the bloody encounter was portrayed by Jihadists groups as another victory, this time on the “big Satan” forces itself.

Israeli withdrawls from southern Lebanon in 2000 and 2006 have also provided propaganda material for terrorist groups, particurally Hamas and Hezbollah. The most recent withdrawl in 2006, which occurred after Israel failed to achieve its stated goals of resucing IDF soliders and disarming Hezbollah, gave the latter sufficent power to openly challenge the Lebanese government.

The U.S led-war in Afghanistan dealt Al Qaeda a major blow. The organization’s top commanders are on the run and financial transactions from Muslim charity organizations – a major fiscal vehicle for terrorists - are closely monitored. Al Qaeda is believed have lost its ability to carry out large scale attacks such as those of 9/11. However, many of the Mujahideen veterans who gained valuable combat experience during the Russian/Afghani war returned to their homelands, creating independent jihadist sleeper cells around the globe.

Al Qaeda’s ideology and vision of re-creating the Muslim Ummah (a united Muslim nation, ruled in after the style of Mohammedian times) has led to the creation of homegrown independent cells that exist throughout Europe . These cells, like those that carried out the attacks in Casablanca Istanbul, London or the more recent cell that was captured in Germany, adopted the Al Qaeda ideology but are completely independent in funding, recruiting and targets selection.

In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group published its conclusions suggesting that President Bush's administration war policies have failed. The group’s members recommended aUS military pullout by early 2008, concentrating on training the Iraqi military, while approaching a "diplomatic offensive" by engaging talks withIran and Syria-- both of which are on the U.S. State Department list of countries sponsoring terrorism-- in an effort to quell sectarian violence and help the virtually non-existent Iraqi government.

While one can argue the motivation behind the war inIraq , and the “success” of the American led coalition inIraq achieved so far, the withdrawal of these military forces from Iraq prior to establishing a stable independent Iraqi government would paint the future of the global Jihadist movement in the brightest colors ever. There is no doubt that all the insurgency groups including Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad ( popularly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq) will take credit for the “achievement” which will have long term implications on the global war on terrorism and on moderate Islamic governments.

While Iraq most likely would be thrown into an all out civil war, Sunni’s and Shiites are known to unite when finding a common enemy. For example, the Shiite Hezbollah terrorist organization has trained and sponsored the Sunni terrorist Hamas organization in its fight against Israel . Syria is governed by the minority Alawite sect, but 74 percent of its population is Sunni, and the state aids the Shiite Hezbollah terrorist organization.Iran in turn, which is the largest Shiite state, aided Syria and provided it with weapons.

Unlike a conventional war where the enemy forces size and locations are a known factor, fighting the Jihadi terrorists’ movement is a virtual war with many unknown factors. While a conventional war takes place between sovereign nations and in their territory, the war against the Jihadi movement is borderless, the enemy is not in uniformed, his members come from all walks of life and cultures, speak many languages and in many cases do not need to penetrate enemy lines as its cells are already here. A conventional war is a very intense event that takes a relatively short period of time leading to a definitive situation, such as peace negotiations or unconditional surrender. Fighting the global Jihadi terrorist organizations is a continuing battle with no time frames or predictable moves.

As the Jihadi groups declared a war centered on a religious dimension, which will end only after the rest of the world converts to Islam, it is unlikely that the terrorism campaign affiliated with these groups will diminish any time soon. Though Al Qaeda has lost its capabilities to carry out a large sophisticated attack, its affiliated groups and home grown cells operating under its agenda are more than capable and willing to carry out attacks on “soft targets” throughout the world, taking advantage of all intelligence agencies’ lack of Humit intelligence. These attacks will almost certainly focus on multiple attacks on “soft” targets, such as marketplaces, mass transit, an d tourist sites.

As we have witnessed in previous large military campaigns, such as US led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority territories and the Russian military operations in Chechnya just to name a few, success is very limited when attempting to confront guerilla warfare with conventional tactics, and drastically diminishes further as these campaigns are dragged into an occupation situation. Mass casualties of military personnel and civilians put domestic pressure on governments to pull their solders back, even if the operational objectives have not been reached.

There is no instant solution to terrorism. New anti-antiterrorism laws and attempts to block monetary transactions are a step in the right direction, but have not diminished the Jihadist groups’ ability to carry out attacks. Therefore more severe measures are needed.

Though not very popular and hard to plan and carry out, targeted assassinations of group leaders, mentors, and masterminds have a proven positive impact in the short term and mid-term. Though the willingness of some young Muslims to die in the name of Allah will not diminish, the lack of leadership and mid-ranking operatives will effectively lead to a reduction and scope of attacks.

The assassination of Aslan Maskhadov and the accidental assassination of Şamil Basayev inChechnya left a gap which no other Chechen rebel leader could fill, and led to a drastic decline in the number and size of attacks by Islamist rebels in Russia.

Israel’s frequent assassination of terrorist organization leaders and (especially those of Hamas’ spiritual Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi and many mid level masterminds) caused number of Hamas’ leaders in Gaza to go underground fearing for their lives, resulting in a unilateral “Hudna” ( a tactical cease fire ) in order to preserve the remaining Hamas leadership and reorganize.

Ever since the targeted assassination of Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Al Qaeda leader in Iraq) in June 2006 and the unconfirmed death of his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri in May 2007, Al Qaeda suffered major blows, to the point where some US generals advocate a declaration of victory over the group (which is viewed by many analysts as premature).

In the long term, however, any solution for terrorism has to involve radical changes to the structure of some predominately Muslim nations, creating more equality and opportuintis for the disenfranchised Muslim youth that form the core of many terrorist groups’ combatants.

Though the global Jihadist movement came to the world attention following the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States , the movement predated the creation of Al Qaeda. The beginning of the global Jihadist movement can be traced back to the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in March 1928 by the Islamic Scholar Hassan Al Banna in Egypt . By 1945 the organization had about half a million followers throughout the Arab world advocating the group’s two main objectives: to fight secularism and Western influence on the Arab society, and the return to ‘Sharia’ (Islamic) law. Following the 1948 assassination of the Egyptian prime minister by group members, the organization was banned throughout the Arab world. Its former members and ideology, however, continued to spread throughout the world, inspiring other terrorist organizations.

The year 1979 was a turning point for fundamentalist Islam. This year saw the Iranian revolution (with the subsequent establishment of the first modern Muslim government), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the issuing of a fatwa (by Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a respected theologian who later on became Osama bin Laden’s mentor) declaring holy war in Afghanistan and the Palestinian-occupied territories. Combined, these issues were critical in the establishment of a truly global jihadist movement.

The same year Ayman Al Zawahiry, a former member of the Muslim brotherhood, and the blind Sheikh Omar Abed Al Rahman founded the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Following the 1981 assassination of the Egyptian president Sadat (for signing the 1979 peace agreement with Israel ) authorities destroyed the movement’s infrastructure and arrested many of the group’s members. After his release from jail Al Zawahiry found his way toAfghanistan , where he joined Osama Bin Laden in the creation of Al Qaeda, while the blind Sheikh ended his journey in an American jail after his conviction in the failed attempt to collapse the World Trade Center towers in 1993.

The Russian- Afghanistan war was a turning point for Muslim extremists and a boost for the global jihadist movement. It was the first time that Muslims from all over the world had joined together in the name of Islam to fight a jihad against the Soviet (atheist) occupation of a primarily Muslim state. These jihad fighters -- known as “ mujahideen ” – defeated the Soviet army, gaining worldwide attention by forcing the unilateral super power retreat.

The Soviet military defeat enhanced the mujahideeni religious faith, believing it was the cause of their victory. In 1989 the highly motivated Arab fighters, led by Osama Bin Laden and others, created the Al Qaeda (The Base) in Afghanistan, and began looking for new venues for jihad. Al Qaeda quickly built training camps and filled them with fresh young followers fascinated by war stories and the prevalence of Islam. The next step was aiding Muslims in other parts of the world likeBosnia , Jumo and Kashmir ,Chechnya ,Sudan and, in recent years, Iraq.

The military success inAfghanistan gave Al Qaeda operatives and local Muslim militia in Mogadishu ,Somalia the courage to attack the US forces on a mission to arrest Somali clan officials. The withdrawal of theUS forces from Somalia soon after the bloody encounter was portrayed by Jihadists groups as another victory, this time on the “big Satan” forces itself.

Israeli withdrawls from southern Lebanon in 2000 and 2006 have also provided propaganda material for terrorist groups, particurally Hamas and Hezbollah. The most recent withdrawl in 2006, which occurred after Israel failed to achieve its stated goals of resucing IDF soliders and disarming Hezbollah, gave the latter sufficent power to openly challenge the Lebanese government.

The U.S led-war in Afghanistan dealt Al Qaeda a major blow. The organization’s top commanders are on the run and financial transactions from Muslim charity organizations – a major fiscal vehicle for terrorists - are closely monitored. Al Qaeda is believed have lost its ability to carry out large scale attacks such as those of 9/11. However, many of the Mujahideen veterans who gained valuable combat experience during the Russian/Afghani war returned to their homelands, creating independent jihadist sleeper cells around the globe.

Al Qaeda’s ideology and vision of re-creating the Muslim Ummah (a united Muslim nation, ruled in after the style of Mohammedian times) has led to the creation of homegrown independent cells that exist throughout Europe . These cells, like those that carried out the attacks in Casablanca Istanbul, London or the more recent cell that was captured in Germany, adopted the Al Qaeda ideology but are completely independent in funding, recruiting and targets selection.

In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group published its conclusions suggesting that President Bush's administration war policies have failed. The group’s members recommended aUS military pullout by early 2008, concentrating on training the Iraqi military, while approaching a "diplomatic offensive" by engaging talks withIran and Syria-- both of which are on the U.S. State Department list of countries sponsoring terrorism-- in an effort to quell sectarian violence and help the virtually non-existent Iraqi government.

While one can argue the motivation behind the war inIraq , and the “success” of the American led coalition inIraq achieved so far, the withdrawal of these military forces from Iraq prior to establishing a stable independent Iraqi government would paint the future of the global Jihadist movement in the brightest colors ever. There is no doubt that all the insurgency groups including Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad ( popularly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq) will take credit for the “achievement” which will have long term implications on the global war on terrorism and on moderate Islamic governments.

While Iraq most likely would be thrown into an all out civil war, Sunni’s and Shiites are known to unite when finding a common enemy. For example, the Shiite Hezbollah terrorist organization has trained and sponsored the Sunni terrorist Hamas organization in its fight against Israel . Syria is governed by the minority Alawite sect, but 74 percent of its population is Sunni, and the state aids the Shiite Hezbollah terrorist organization.Iran in turn, which is the largest Shiite state, aided Syria and provided it with weapons.

Unlike a conventional war where the enemy forces size and locations are a known factor, fighting the Jihadi terrorists’ movement is a virtual war with many unknown factors. While a conventional war takes place between sovereign nations and in their territory, the war against the Jihadi movement is borderless, the enemy is not in uniformed, his members come from all walks of life and cultures, speak many languages and in many cases do not need to penetrate enemy lines as its cells are already here. A conventional war is a very intense event that takes a relatively short period of time leading to a definitive situation, such as peace negotiations or unconditional surrender. Fighting the global Jihadi terrorist organizations is a continuing battle with no time frames or predictable moves.

As the Jihadi groups declared a war centered on a religious dimension, which will end only after the rest of the world converts to Islam, it is unlikely that the terrorism campaign affiliated with these groups will diminish any time soon. Though Al Qaeda has lost its capabilities to carry out a large sophisticated attack, its affiliated groups and home grown cells operating under its agenda are more than capable and willing to carry out attacks on “soft targets” throughout the world, taking advantage of all intelligence agencies’ lack of Humit intelligence. These attacks will almost certainly focus on multiple attacks on “soft” targets, such as marketplaces, mass transit, an d tourist sites.

As we have witnessed in previous large military campaigns, such as US led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority territories and the Russian military operations in Chechnya just to name a few, success is very limited when attempting to confront guerilla warfare with conventional tactics, and drastically diminishes further as these campaigns are dragged into an occupation situation. Mass casualties of military personnel and civilians put domestic pressure on governments to pull their solders back, even if the operational objectives have not been reached.

There is no instant solution to terrorism. New anti-antiterrorism laws and attempts to block monetary transactions are a step in the right direction, but have not diminished the Jihadist groups’ ability to carry out attacks. Therefore more severe measures are needed.

Though not very popular and hard to plan and carry out, targeted assassinations of group leaders, mentors, and masterminds have a proven positive impact in the short term and mid-term. Though the willingness of some young Muslims to die in the name of Allah will not diminish, the lack of leadership and mid-ranking operatives will effectively lead to a reduction and scope of attacks.

The assassination of Aslan Maskhadov and the accidental assassination of Şamil Basayev inChechnya left a gap which no other Chechen rebel leader could fill, and led to a drastic decline in the number and size of attacks by Islamist rebels in Russia.

Israel’s frequent assassination of terrorist organization leaders and (especially those of Hamas’ spiritual Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi and many mid level masterminds) caused number of Hamas’ leaders in Gaza to go underground fearing for their lives, resulting in a unilateral “Hudna” ( a tactical cease fire ) in order to preserve the remaining Hamas leadership and reorganize.

Ever since the targeted assassination of Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Al Qaeda leader in Iraq) in June 2006 and the unconfirmed death of his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri in May 2007, Al Qaeda suffered major blows, to the point where some US generals advocate a declaration of victory over the group (which is viewed by many analysts as premature).

In the long term, however, any solution for terrorism has to involve radical changes to the structure of some predominately Muslim nations, creating more equality and opportuintis for the disenfranchised Muslim youth that form the core of many terrorist groups’ combatants.